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INTRODUCTION
n May 8, 2015, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
decided by a majority that the Tribunal has jurisdiction
to hear cases against not only individuals but also legal persons
or corporate entities.1 The judges found that the term “person,”
as set out within Rule 60 bis of the Statute of the Tribunal, in-
cludes both natural human beings and legal entities, guided by
“interpretation that is consonant with the spirit of the statute”
and other international and domestic legal principles.2 This de-
1. The STL was established on January 23, 2007 by the United Nations
(UN) and the Lebanese government to carry out the investigation and prose-
cution of those responsible for terrorist acts that occurred within Lebanon in
2005. With regard to this decision, the defense challenged the jurisdiction of
the STL over legal persons, an argument which was accepted by the Con-
tempt Judge but rejected by the Appeals Chamber. Thus, the case against
both defendants was allowed to go to trial. See Prosecutor v. Al Jadeed
S.A.L., STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concern-




2. The court found:
With respect to the object and purpose of Rule 60 bis to hold
accountable those who interfere with the administration of
justice [. . .] the Appeals Panel finds that this object would
be impeded should legal entities be excluded from prosecu-
tion as a rule. Additionally, the Appeals Panel has exam-
ined evolving international standards on human rights and
corporate accountability as well as trends in national laws.
O
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cision represents a significant development in international
criminal law because it recognizes that corporations, in addi-
tion to individuals, can be tried as entities by an international
court. As such, it challenges the traditional notion that only
crimes of men, and not those of abstract entities, can be re-
sponsible for gross human rights abuses amounting to interna-
tional crimes.3
These developments come in light of recent discussions
among scholars and practitioners about the possibility of rec-
ognizing corporate liability for international crimes, with re-
ports of companies involved in forced labor, child labor, slavery,
torture, extra-judicial killing, and the pillaging of natural re-
sources, particularly in weak or failed states.4 In 2011, the UN
Current international standards on human rights support
an interpretation that is consonant with imposing criminal
liability on legal persons [. . . .] With respect to the Lebanese
Code of Criminal Procedure, the Appeals Panel considers it
relevant that legal persons can be criminally liable under
Lebanese criminal law.
Id.
3. Cf. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947).
4. See generally Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maa, Corporate Ac-
countability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes,
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699 (2010) (providing an overview of developments in
case law); Normal Farrell, Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors,
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 873 (2010) (examining potential attribution of responsi-
bility to corporations); DESISLAVA STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE
LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2010) (examining the possibility
of regulating business enterprises through international criminal law); On
corporate responsibility to respect human rights see Steven Ratner, Corpora-
tions and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443
(2001); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 901, 912 13 (2003); David Kinley & Junko
Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities
for Corporations and International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 931, 933 (2004);
John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving Internation-
al Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 819, 819 20 (2007); for scholars arguing in
favor of corporate criminal liability for international crimes, see James Stew-
art, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes:
Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. & POL. 121 (2014)
(arguing that “corporate criminal liability for international crimes in national
systems is the next obvious “discovery” in corporate responsibility”); Andrew
Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the Individual to
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brought more attention to the accountability of corporations
with its adoption of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (“UN Guiding Principles”), which affirms the
duty of states under existing human rights principles to protect
against human rights abuses committed by business enterpris-
es within their territory or jurisdiction.5
While the decision of the STL has become an important prec-
edent for other national and international courts in the inter-
national criminal justice system with regards to holding corpo-
rations accountable for international crimes, many practical
obstacles and challenges remain. As is illustrated by examples
in Burma (also internationally recognized as Myanmar) and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),6 discussed in greater
detail below, foreign companies in the mining and oil industry
may be involved in serious human rights abuses in countries
with weak governance, and various political, legal, and econom-
ic factors can discourage the host and the home state from in-
Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 899, 902
(2008) (arguing that “corporations have international obligations particu-
larly in the area of international criminal law”); Amol Mehra & Katie Shay,
Persisting Harm: Corporate Responsibility and Accountability for Modern
Forms of Slavery, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 453 (2016) (arguing for enhanced
domestic criminal law enforcement against companies as increased prosecu-
tion “would likely to have a positive influence on company behaviour”).
5. See John Ruggie (U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implement-
ing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights] (declaring that states should consider recognizing
liability for enterprises domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction where sys-
tematic gaps in dealing with gross human rights abuses have been identified,
and that business enterprises should “[t]reat the risk of causing or contrib-
uting to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they
operate”); see also JOHN RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ANDHUMANRIGHTS 40 42 (2013).
6. Based on the view of the US and the UK, this paper will refer to the
country as “Burma,” unless referencing a specific title. See, Andrew Selth &
Adam Gallagher, What’s in a Name: Burma or Myanmar? A Decision by the
U.S. to Accept the Name Myanmar Seems Unlikely Any Time Soon, U.S. INST.
OF PEACE (June 21, 2018), https://www.usip.org/blog/2018/06/whats-name-
burma-or-myanmar.
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vestigating the alleged abuses.7 More specifically, complex cor-
porate structures, the extraterritorial dimension of the crimes,
competition among states and businesses, corruption, corporate
influence over governments, lack of institutional capacity, and
lack of interstate coordination often create disincentives for
states to take action against business enterprises.8
Against this backdrop, this article provides a preliminary ex-
amination on how the UN and other international and regional
institutions may be able to influence states to address these
challenges in order to prevent business involvement in serious
human rights abuses at home and abroad.
Part I of this article examines forced labor allegations in
Burma and the DRC. Based on these case studies, Part II will
analyze current limitations in the domestic and international
system in preventing corporate complicity in serious human
rights abuses that may amount to international crimes. Part
III will examine possible ways to reduce the governance gap
pertaining to these crimes based on current discussions at the
7. See e.g. EarthRights Int’l, Energy Insecurity, How Total, Chevron, and
PTTEP Contribute to Human Rights Violations, Financial Secrecy, and Nu-
clear Proliferation in Burma (July 2010),
https://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/energy-
insecurity.pdf; Amnesty Int’l, Profits and Loss, Mining and Human Rights in
Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, AFR 62/001/2013 (2013),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/afr620012013en.pdf.
8. Reports from the UN and nongovernmental organizations explain the
legal, financial, and political obstacles. See generally Jennifer Zerk, OHCHR,
Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses, Towards a Fairer and
More Effective System Of Domestic Law Remedies (Feb. 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/Stu
dyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf (explaining the “legal, financial, practical and
procedural barriers” for domestic law responses to business involvement in
gross human rights abuses); Mark B. Taylor, Robert C. Thompson & Anita
Ramasastry, FAFO Research Foundation, Amnesty Int’l, Norwegian Peace-
building Centre, Overcoming Obstacles to Justice: Improving Access to Judi-
cial Remedies for Business Involvement in Grave Human Rights Abuses 9
(2010), http://www.fafo.no/media/com_netsukii/20165.pdf (explaining the po-
litical, financial, and legal obstacles); Amnesty Int’l, Injustice Incorporated,
Corporate Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy, Al Index POL
30/001/2014 (Mar. 7, 2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/8000/pol300012014en.pdf
(explaining how the issues of extraterritoriality, lack of information, and
state-business nexus create legal challenges for pursuing corporate accounta-
bility).
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UN, including the possible adoption of a treaty on business and
human rights.
I. FORCED LABOR ALLEGATIONS IN BURMA AND THEDRC
Countries such as Burma and the DRC have faced some of
the most serious forms of human rights abuses due to their
long histories of military rule and conflict, exposing many for-
eign companies investing in these countries to serious human
rights risks. The following case studies highlight some of these
forced labor allegations against foreign companies to illustrate
how forced labor can occur in business activities, as well as how
it was addressed by the government and other relevant actors.
A. Situation in Burma
Burma has had a long history of human rights abuse, includ-
ing systematic and egregious human rights abuses against its
local people due to the long-standing military regime that held
power from 1962 to 2011.9 The human rights situation in Bur-
ma was first addressed by the international community in 1991
when it was under the rule of the State Law and Order Resto-
ration Council.10 Since then, the UN Commission on Human
Rights and the International Labor Organization (ILO) Com-
mission on Inquiry have affirmed forced labor as a serious is-
sue in Burma.11
9. See BERTIL LINTENER, OUTRAGE: BURMA’S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY
192 206 (1990); see also MATHEA FALCO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., BURMA,
TIME FOR CHANGE 8 (2003), http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/burma-time-
change/p6054.
10. G.A. Res. 46/132, Situation in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/132 (Dec.
17, 1991) (“Noting with concern substantive available information indicating
a grave human rights situation in Myanmar”).
11. Commission on Human Rights Res., Situation of Human Rights in My-
anmar, 1992/58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1992/58, ¶ 2 (Mar. 3, 1992). The In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO) has noted:
There is abundant evidence before the Commission showing
the pervasive use of forced labor imposed on the civilian
population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the
military for portering, the construction, maintenance and
servicing of military camps, other work in support of the
military, work on agriculture, logging and other production
projects undertaken by the authorities or the military,
sometimes for the profit of private individuals, the construc-
2019] Reducing the Governance Gap 199
1. Reports of gross and systematic’ human rights abuse in
Burma
It was in 2010 when the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, pointed out that
gross and systematic human rights violations were taking
place, which may have amounted to crimes against humanity
or war crimes under the terms of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC).12 Following its long military
rule, the government has made democratization efforts since
Thein Sein became President of Burma in 2011, which led to
the lifting of international economic sanctions and the estab-
lishment of diplomatic exchanges between the US and Bur-
ma.13 A joint commitment to implement the ILO action to elim-
tion and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other
infrastructure work and a range of other tasks. . . .
Int’l Labor Org. [ILO], Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma): Report of the
Commission of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the
International Labor Organization to Examine the Observance by Myanmar of
the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ¶ 528 (July 2, 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm
.
12. For the UN’s report addressing the possibility of international crimes
occurring in Burma see Human Rights Council Res. 10/27, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/13/48, ¶ 121 22 (Mar. 10, 2010).
According to consistent reports, the possibility exists that
some of these human rights violations may entail categories
of crimes against humanity or war crimes under the terms
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. . . .
United Nations institutions may consider the possibility to
establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding
mandate to address the question of international crimes.
Id. See also LINTENER, supra note 9, at 192; see also FALCO, supra note 9, at 8.
13. Lionel Barber & Gwen Robinson, Thein Sein Vows to Step Up Myan-
mar Reforms, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b0fe31c8-9d07-11e2-88e9-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GqIdI7q6; see Publication of General Licenses Re-
lated to the Burma Sanction Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 69, 21497 (Apr. 10, 2013)
(products of Burmese origin had been banned from entry into the US in the
past, but on Nov. 16, 2012, the US Dept. of Treasury issued General License
No. 18, which allows the import into the US of any article that is a product of
Burma with certain limitations); see also Paul Eckert & Peter Cooney, U.S.
Lifts More Sanctions on Myanmar To Support Reforms, REUTERS (May 2,
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inate forced labor in Burma was also signed with President
Obama in 2012, which helped lift ILO restrictions on Burma in
June 2012.14
Nonetheless, reports about human rights abuses perpetrated
by Burmese authorities continued. In 2013, the UN General
Assembly expressed its concern over human rights violations
occurring in Burma, “including arbitrary detention, forced dis-
placement, land confiscation, rape and other forms of sexual
violence, and torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment,” and called upon the Burmese government “to take nec-
essary measures to ensure accountability and end impunity,
including by undertaking a full transparent and independent
investigation into all reports.”15 Most recently, Burma was crit-
icized by the international community for the Rohingya crisis,
whereby the military regime led a crackdown in response to an
attack by Muslim militants on Burmese police posts.16 In Sep-
tember 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
called the military operation in Rakhine “a textbook example of
ethnic cleansing” by citing to satellite imagery and accounts of
extrajudicial killings.17 As such, the human rights situation has
not progressed despite Burma’s democratization movement,
exposing more companies to serious human rights risks.
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-myanmar-usa-sanctions-
idUSBRE9411AR20130502.
14. ILO, US President in Myanmar: ILO Director-General Welcomes Joint
Commitment to Implementation of ILO Plan to Eliminate Forced Labor (Nov.
19 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/ilo-director-
general/statements-and-speeches/WCMS_193629/lang en/index.htm (The
Myanmar government agreed to end forced labor in the country and allow the
workers the right to set up trade unions freely); ILO, ILO Lifts Restrictions
on Myanmar (June 13, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_183287/lang en/index.htm.
15. G.A. Res. 67/233, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/67/233, (Apr. 8, 2013).
16. See Two Years on, a Look at the Rohingya Crisis, REUTERS (Aug. 23,
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-timeline/two-
years-on-a-look-at-the-rohingya-crisis-idUSKCN1VD044.
17. U. N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Opening
Statement by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for
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2. Alleged Human Rights Abuses in Connection with the Shwe
Gas Projects
The Shwe Gas Project began in 2000 when the Korean com-
pany Daewoo International (“Daewoo”), which is now a part of
a Korean conglomerate, POSCO,18 signed a production-sharing
contract with Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to kick
off its overseas development operations.19 When Daewoo dis-
covered huge gas reserves in the Shwe gas field in 2004, many
other developers began to join the project, such as the state-
controlled Korean Gas Corporation (“KOGAS”) and other Indi-
an developers like ONGC Videsh Limited and GAIL Limited,
forming the “Shwe Consortium.”20 The Consortium also signed
a $1.4 billion contract with South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy In-
dustries to construct an undersea pipeline and other offshore
natural gas production facilities.21
The onshore gas pipeline, constructed by the South-East Asia
Pipeline Company Limited (SEAP), a Hong Kong registered
entity created by the China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) and other Shwe Consortium members, extends 771km
to the border of China’s Yunnan province in Southwest China.22
18. Se Young Lee, Posco to Buy 68% Stake in Daewoo International, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703369704575460860690937
610.html.
19. DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL, A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT TO BETTER
UNDERSTAND THE SHWE PROJECT, PROJECT OVERVIEW 4 (2011),
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/1010226.
20. Bae Hyun-Jung, Daewoo International Kick-starts Gas Operation in
Myanmar, KOREA HERALD (July 21, 2013),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130721000164; EarthRights
Int’l, Situation Briefer No. 1, The Burma-China Pipelines: Human Rights
Violations, Applicable Law, and Revenue Secrecy 3 (March 2011),
https://earthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/the-burma-china-pipelines.pdf
(According to EarthRights Int’l, Daewoo owns 51% of the Shwe Consortium,
Gail 9%, KOGAS 8%, MOGE 15%, ONGC Videsh Ltd. 17%, respectively).
21. Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., Hyundai Heavy Signs $1.4 Billion
Myanmar Gas Plant Deal (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://english.hhi.co.kr/news/view?idx=367.
22. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Myanmar-China
Crude Pipeline officially put into operation (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/nr2017/201704/fb3ec32752134be884529e5523c0e
80d.shtml; DAEWOO INTERNATIONAL, supra note 19 ; Sudha Ramachandran,
China Secures Myanmar Energy Route, ASIA TIMES (April 3, 2009),
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The Myanmar China Gas Pipeline Project is based on an
agreement between Burma’s Ministry of Energy and CNPC for
the construction, operation, and management of the Myanmar-
China Crude Pipeline.23 On July 21, 2013, it was reported that
the gas pipeline project had been completed.24
The project is regarded as a success for its gas reserves dis-
covery, but the operation has also spurred concerns over its
human rights policies in the last decade. Civil society and other
non-profit organizations have accused companies involved in
the pipeline project of failing to meet international standards
for environmental and human rights protection, based on the
project’s destruction of villages, forced labor of local people due
to the presence of security forces around the pipelines, under-
age military recruitment, and forced displacement.25 More spe-
cifically, civil society organizations have found that Burmese
Army battalions are stationed around the Burma-China pipe-
lines, and soldiers will force civilians to join the local militia
and work on various projects around the pipelines.26
B. Situation in the DRC
The DRC has faced some of the worst forms of human rights
abuse due to its history of armed conflict and rich mineral re-
sources. As a result, many companies were alleged to be in-
volved in human rights abuse, particularly forced labor, in the
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KD03Df03.html (CNPC holds
50.9% of shares, with the rest owned by MOGE).
23. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), CNPC in Myanmar,
Major Events https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/Myanmar/country_index.shtml
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
24. Hyun-Jung, supra note 20; Myanmar-China Gas Pipeline Starts to De-
liver Gas to China, CHINA DAILY USA (July 29, 2013),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-07/28/content_16844673.htm.
25. See generally Shwe Gas Movement, Good Governance and the Extrac-
tive Industry in Burma (July 16, 2013), http://www.shwe.org/good-
governance-and-the-extractive-industry-in-burma/; Shwe Gas Movement,
Sold Out, Launch of China Pipeline Project Unleashes Abuse Across Burma
(Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.shwe.org/campaign-update/sold-out-new-report/;
Earth Rights Int’l, supra note 20, at 5 (reporting that “there are at least
twenty-eight Burmese Army battalions stationed in the area of the Burma-
China pipelines”).
26. Earth Rights Int’l, supra note 20, at 11. (reporting that soldiers around
the pipelines “forced villagers to join the local fire brigade and a local militia[,
and] to work on the construction of a health clinic that is part of [a compa-
ny’s] socio-economic program”).
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DRC. This case study will highlight some of the allegations
that were made towards companies from China.
1. History of Armed Conflict in the DRC
Conflict in the DRC can be described in terms of two wars.
The first war began in 1996 when the Rwandan army invaded
eastern DRC, backing the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila,
who toppled President Mobutu Sese Seko.27 The second war,
known as the Second Congolese War, began in August 1998
when Kabila broke with his Rwandan allies who, in turn,
backed a new rebel group, the Rassemblement Congolais pour
la Démoratie (RC), in an attempt to overthrow Kabila.28 This
second war cost over three million lives, resulting in the most
devastating conflict since World War II.29
The DRC did, however, make some progress toward promot-
ing peace and democracy after the war. The 2002 Agreement at
Sun City, South Africa between the main Congolese warring
groups and the DRC government along with other separate
agreements with Rwanda and Uganda marked the end of the
Second Congolese War.30 In 2003, a transitional government
was appointed with an interim Constitution.31 Elections were
held in 2005, and a newly approved Constitution came into ef-
fect in 2006, providing the institutional framework for the
transition.32
27. For comprehensive historical background, see generally OHCHR, Re-
port of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the
Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and
June 2003, ¶ 19 (Aug. 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_F
INAL_EN.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Report of the Mapping Exercise].
28. Id.
29. Int’l Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey (July 2004),
https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/migrated/resources/DRC_MortalityS
urvey2004_RB_8Dec04.pdf.
30. See U.N. Report of the Mapping Exercise, supra note 27, ¶ 19.
31. See generally Kai Peter Ziegler, Democratic Republic of the Congo: The
Transitional Constitution of April 1, 2003, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 662 (2005).
32. U.N. Report of the Mapping Exercise, supra note 27, ¶ 805.
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Despite these efforts, however, armed conflict and political
unrest continues in certain parts of the country to this day.33
These crises are exacerbated by the fact that much of the popu-
lation in the DRC lives in extreme poverty. According to the
2015 Human Development Report, the DRC was ranked 176 on
the Human Development Index out of 188 countries.34 Never-
theless, foreign companies continue to invest in the DRC due to
its rich mineral resources, regardless of the lack of safeguards
in place to prevent corporate complicity in human rights abus-
es.
2. Artisanal Mining and Alleged Human Rights Abuses in the
Katanga Region
Significant deposits of minerals and metals can be found in
the DRC today, including the world’s largest reserve of cobalt.
The DRC provides half of the world’s cobalt every year.35 As a
result, the country heavily relies on the mining industry for
development. Mining is also reported to have fueled much of
the conflict in the region. In 2001, a panel of experts estab-
lished under the UN Security Council found that extraction of
the DRC’s resources has financed and contributed to the con-
flict in the DRC.36 These minerals are therefore often referred
33. See DR Congo: Ban says Recommitment to Peace Framework Critical to
Addressing Root Cause of Conflict, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 22,
2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48784; see
OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights and the Activities of the United Nations
Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/30/32 (July 27, 2015).




35. Katrina Manson, DRC: Land of Wasted Opportunity Slips Further,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/17c40540-
4e8a-11e1-ada2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EJLKivzv (“It is also the second
biggest copper-rich region, with 70m tonnes in reserves”).
36. U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
transmitted by letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/357, ¶ 109 (Apr. 12, 2001)
(“The panel finds a link between the exploitation of the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of the conflict.” In
¶ 148, the panel concluded that “[t]he [DRC] relied on its minerals and min-
ing industries to finance the war”).
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to as “conflict minerals,” as provided under the Dodd-Frank
Act.37
There continue to be widespread reports that the Congolese
national army and armed groups in various regions take con-
trol over mine sites to seize economic, political, and military
power.38 Although mining in the DRC is often carried out by
artisanal miners, industrial mining involving foreign compa-
nies is also on the rise.39 Artisanal miners are therefore partic-
ularly vulnerable to both state officials and private actors who
have actual control over the mine sites.40
Mineral extraction is particularly widespread in the Katanga
region, where much of the mining operation is conducted
through artisanal mining.41 Miners in this region often work in
poor conditions, and an increasing number of companies
particularly companies from China are allegedly involved in
serious forms of human rights abuses.42 In 2008, out of seventy-
five processing companies in Katanga, sixty were Chinese-
owned and over ninety percent of the province’s minerals were
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78m (2012) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act § 1502] (Congress enact-
ed Section 1502 of the Act because of concerns that the exploitation and trade
of conflict minerals by armed groups is helping to finance the conflict in the
DRC region).
38. Global Witness, Faced With a Gun, What Can You Do? War and the
Militarisation of Mining In Eastern Congo (July 21, 2009),
https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/report_en_final_0.pdf
(explaining how companies are buying from suppliers who trade in minerals
from the warring parties).
39. WORLD BANK, Democratic Republic of Congo Growth with Governance
in the Mining Sector, 56 (May 2008),
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P106982/drc-growth-governance-mineral-
sector?lang=en.
40. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 7 (stating that artisanal miners, who
are miners not officially employed by a mining company and instead work
independently, are “often forced to sell minerals to specific individuals or
companies under threat of being denied access to the mining site in the fu-
ture, affecting their ability to make a living”); see also Global Witness, Dig-




41. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 4 5.
42. Id. at 4 6.
206 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 45:1
sent to China.43 This is a result of the $6 billion resources-for-
infrastructure deal that was initially signed by the Chinese
State construction companies and the DRC’s state-owned cop-
per company, Gécamines, in September 2007, followed by a
more detailed agreement in April 2008.44 This Sino-Congolese
joint venture created Sino-Congolaise des Mines
(SICOMINES).45
Numerous civil society groups have alleged that in these op-
erations, Chinese companies and their supply chains are in-
volved in forced labor and forced eviction of Congolese miners.46
At the Tilwezembe mine, in particular, conditions for artisanal
miners are reported to be difficult and dangerous.47 Amnesty
International provided that “several sources confirmed that
there are frequent injuries and some fatal accidents as a result
of landslides, falling boulders, or asphyxiation due to a lack of
adequate ventilation.”48 After conducting various surveys, civil
society groups further reported that Chinese companies have
little or no understanding of international labor standards, and
minerals sold to trading houses are illegally mined using child
43. See Rights & Accountability in Development, Chinese Mining Opera-
tions in Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 (Sept. 2009),
http://www.raid-uk.org/sites/default/files/drc-china-report.pdf.
44. Global Witness, China and Congo: Friends in Need, A Report by Global
Witness On The Democratic Republic of Congo (Mar. 2011),
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/friends_in_need_en_lr.
pdf (explaining background and details of the agreement and further stating
that the infrastructure component was revised from 6 billion to 3 billion dol-
lars in 2009 ); see also Lee Spears, China Railway Group Raises Investment
in Congo Mining Project, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=auhWWOCGioF
M.
45. Michael J. Kavanagh, Sicomines to Begin Copper Output in 2015 as
Reserve Estimate Cut, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-24/sicomines-to-begin-copper-
output-in-2015-as-reserve-estimate-cut.html (explaining that “[t]he Chinese
companies, including the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp. and
Sinohydro Corp., hold sixty-eight percent of Sicomines, while Gecamines and
another state-run Congolese company owns the rest”).
46. See Rights & Accountability in Development, Chinese Mining Opera-
tions in Katanga, DRC, supra note 43; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 5.
47. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 13.
48. Id. (reporting based on interviews with artisanal miners at Mwangeji
Hospital in Kolwezi, and at Tilwezembe and Kawama mining townships).
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labor.49 Despite this, DRC authorities allow these Chinese
companies to exercise significant control over the mining sites
with their state authorities often present at these site.50 Forced
evictions have also taken place in the settlement of Luisha,
which is frequently taken over by companies with ties to the
political elite.51 In 2012, Glenocore, a Swiss-based commodities
giant, was also accused of child labor in the DRC.52
C. Corporate Complicity in Gas and Mining Projects
Based on the case studies of Burma and the DRC, this section
aims to explain the legal implications of these two examples on
both the domestic and international level. The first part of this
section examines whether these serious human rights abuses
amount to international crimes under international law. The
second part aims to determine whether these business activi-
ties caused the abuses and explores the possibility of pursuing
corporate accountability.
49. See Rights & Accountability in Development, Chinese Mining Opera-
tions in Katanga, DRC, supra note 43, at iv, 17 19 (“There were an estimated
one million artisanal miners, 20,000 of whom were children in Katanga as of
August 2008”); see also Frank Piasecki Poulsen, Children of the Congo Who
Risk Their Lives to Supply Our Mobile Phones, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/congo-child-labour-
mobile-minerals (reporting that “children are working to extract minerals
essential for the electronics industry.”).
50. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 17; see also Tracy Fehr, The Congo
Connection between Slavery and Conflict Minerals, ENOUGH PROJECT (July 7,
2011), http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/congo-connection-between-slavery-
and-conflict-minerals (reporting that “slaves in and around the mines in
eastern DRC serve as free and/or cheap labor for armed groups, enabling
them to continue their trade in conflict minerals.”).
51. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 7, at 22 (reporting based on interviews by
Amnesty International with artisanal miners in Luisha in October 2011).
52. Tim Worstall, Glencore in Child Labour Allegations, FORBES (Apr.15,
2012, 5:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/04/15/glencore-
in-child-labour-allegations/; Nathalie Thomas, Glencore Accused of ‘Child
Labor’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:45
AM GMT),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/9205869/Glencore-accused-
of-child-labour-in-Democratic-Republic-of-Congo.html (reporting based on
investigation by the BBC’s Panorama, Glencore is accused of forcing children
as young as 10 to work in the Tilwezembe mine).
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1. Serious Human Rights Abuses Amounting to International
Crimes
The most serious forms of human rights abuses addressed by
civil society organizations concerning the gas and mining pro-
jects include torture, forced labor, and forced displacement.
Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, these offenses
can be prosecuted as crimes against humanity when committed
as part of a “widespread or systematic attack against [a] civil-
ian population.”53 Forced labor constitutes the offense of en-
slavement under Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, which is
based on the definition of enslavement under the 1926 Slavery
Convention.54 Further, the judgment in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac
identified forced labor as an indicator of enslavement and ob-
served that involuntariness is the fundamental definitional
feature of the abuse.55 With regard to forced displacement of
53. The crimes of torture, forced displacement, and forced labor are offens-
es under Articles 7(2)(c), 7(2)(d), and 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute, respectively.
If these offenses were perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict, they
may constitute a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 353 56 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002) (confirming that slavery is expressly pro-
hibited under Additional Protocol II of 1977).
54. According to the 1926 Slavery Convention, slavery is defined as “the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership are exercised,” see Slavery Convention, Sept. 25,
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; see also International Criminal Court, Elements of
Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Ele-
ments of Crimes] (providing that “the powers attaching to the right of owner-
ship over one or more persons, such as purchasing, selling, lending or barter-
ing such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of
liberty.” A footnote under the Elements of Crimes further explains that “dep-
rivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced [labor]
or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supple-
mentary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956”). Id.
55. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, ¶ 359 (deciding that, “[this is] a factual ques-
tion which has to be considered in light of all the relevant circumstances on a
case by case basis. . . . What must be established is that the relevant persons
had no real choice as to whether they would work”); The Trial Chamber con-
sidered the following factors to be relevant in determining whether an indi-
vidual had a choice to work: 1) “the substantially uncompensated aspect of
the labor performed;” 2) the vulnerable situation of the detainees; 3) allega-
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Burmese and Congolese victims, these acts may constitute “de-
portation or forcible transfer of population” under Article
7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute, as well as torture under Article
7(2)(e).56 Torture is defined as “intentional infliction of severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control of the accused.” 57
Torture, forced labor, and forced displacement may be recog-
nized as crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome
Statute if they meet the following criteria: 1) the act must be
perpetrated in a “widespread or systematic” manner; 2) the act
must be in pursuance or “in furtherance of a [s]tate or organi-
zational policy”; and 3) the act must be perpetrated “with the
knowledge of the attack.”58 As for the elements of the criteria,
the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals has inter-
preted the term “widespread” to mean the large-scale nature of
the attack against civilians and the number of its victims, and
the concept of “systematic” to indicate “the organized nature of
the acts of violence.”59
Regarding the situation in Burma and the DRC, the question
of whether these abuses fall into the category of crimes against
humanity will have to be decided based on the jurisprudence of
these international tribunals. There is, however, evidence that
authorities have been involved in international crimes
throughout both countries. In March 2010, Special Rapporteur
Quintana pointed out in March 2010 that gross and systematic
human rights violations, which may amount to international
crimes, were taking place in Burma as a result of Burma’s
state policy.60 As for the DRC, the UN recently reported in May
tions that unwilling detainees “were either forced to [work] or placed in soli-
tary confinement;” 4) inhumane conditions in the detention camp. Id. ¶ 373.
56. See Rome Statute, supra note 53, arts. 7(2)(d), 7(2)(e).
57. Id.
58. See Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 7.
59. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 648 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 206 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); and Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Trial Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sept. 2 1998).
60. See H.R.C. Res. 13/48, supra note 12, ¶ 121 22 (“United Nations insti-
tutions may consider the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with
a specific fact-finding mandate to address the question of international
crimes”) (“United Nations institutions may consider the possibility to estab-
lish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding mandate to address
210 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 45:1
2015 that Congo rebels continue to be involved in abuses that
may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes in
certain parts of the DRC region.61
2. Causal Link between Project Operations and Human Rights
Abuse
Various UN bodies have recognized the potential connection
between human rights abuses and corporations operating in
Burma and the DRC. With regard to the situation in Burma,
the 1998 Commission on Inquiry first recognized the link be-
tween corporations and human rights abuses by stating that
there is “a pervasive use of forced labor” by Burmese authori-
ties and the military for various construction and production
projects, including infrastructure work in support of the mili-
tary.62 In 2010, Special Rapporteur Quintana recognized in his
the question of international crimes”); see also INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CRIMES IN BURMA 74, 91 (2009),
http://97.97.254.70/hrharvard/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Crimes-in-
Burma.pdf (evaluating Burma’s breaches, such as forced displacement, sexu-
al violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture, in light of the Rome Statute.
According to the report, UN actors have repeatedly claimed that these viola-
tions are both “widespread” and “systematic,” as well as part of a “policy”).
61. See generally Rep. of the U.N. Joint Human Rights Office
On Int’l Humanitarian Law Violations Committed by Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) Combatants in the Territory of Beni, North Kivu Province, Be-
tween 1 October and 31 December 2014 (May
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/ReportMonusco_OHC
HR_May2015_EN.pdf; see also Tom Miles, Congo Rebels May Have Commit-
ted Crimes Against Humanity: U.N., REUTERS (May 13, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congodemocratic-un-
idUSKBN0NY16A20150513.
62. ILO, Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma), supra note 11, ¶ 528. ILO
found in Part V that
[T]here is abundant evidence before the Commission show-
ing the pervasive use of forced labor imposed on the civilian
population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the
military for portering, the construction, maintenance and
servicing of military camps, other work in support of the
military, work on agriculture, logging and other production
projects undertaken by the authorities or the military,
sometimes for the profit of private individuals, the construc-
tion and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other
infrastructure work and a range of other tasks.
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progress report to the UN Human Rights Council that there
were multiple reports of human rights abuses associated with
natural gas projects in Burma, including the Shwe gas pipeline
project.63 Special Rapporteur Quintana further recognized that
the oil companies rely on the Burmese military to provide secu-
rity for their projects, and that “rampant use of forced labor” is
reported in the Yadana pipeline and the Shwe gas pipeline pro-
jects.64
The US State Department’s 2013 Human Trafficking Report
similarly acknowledged the link between corporations and hu-
man rights abuses, stating that “military and civilian officials
have systematically forced men, women, and children into
working for the development of infrastructure, in state-run ag-
ricultural and commercial ventures, and as porters for the mili-
tary,” and that “various forms of coercion, including threats of
financial and physical harm, to compel households to provide
forced labor” have been used.65 Both 2013 and 2014 versions of
the report additionally recognized that forced labor was perpe-
trated by both military officials and entities in the private sec-
tor.66 With regard to forced displacement and land confisca-
tions, in 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur recognized that, alt-
hough there is no clear data, confiscations have been increasing
since 2012 as a result of infrastructure projects and the exploi-
tation of natural resources with the involvement of security
forces, local government officials, and private businesses.67
Id.
63. H.R.C. Res. 13/48, supra note 12, ¶ 112.
64. Id.
65. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 111
(2013) [hereinafter 2013 U.S. Human Trafficking Report].
66. Id, at 111 12; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS REPORT 114 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 U.S. Human Trafficking Re-
port]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 105 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 U.S. Human Trafficking Report] (similarly reporting that
the Burmese military, and to a lesser extent civilian officials as well as some
ethnic armed groups, use various forms of coercion, “including threats of fi-
nancial and physical harm, to compel households to provide forced labor”).
67. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/58 (Apr. 17, 2013) (recommending that
the Government should “ensure the protection of land and housing rights
through impact assessments prior to development projects, consultation with
affected individuals and communities, the provision of adequate restitution
and compensation, and the conferment of legal security of tenure” Id. at ¶ 91;
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Concerning the DRC, various UN reports had already recog-
nized the link between corporations and human rights abuses.
In 2001, a panel of experts established under the UN Security
Council found that the extraction of resources had financed and
fueled the conflict in that country.68 In the panel’s final report,
produced in 2002, it listed twenty-nine companies and fifty-four
individuals for whom it recommended the imposition of finan-
cial restrictions and travel bans.69 The UN panel further re-
ported that many of the mine sites were controlled by high-
ranking political figures from government and armed groups.70
Similarly, the 2014 US Human Trafficking Report stated that
a significant number of Congolese artisanal miners were being
“exploited in situations of debt bondage by business people and
supply dealers.”71 The report also found that mines in the DRC,
including the Katanga region, are often controlled by armed
groups, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR), Mai Mai Kata Katanga and Mai Mai Morgan,
and the March 23 Movement (M23), as well as groups under
the auspices of the Congolese national army (FARDC).72 These
groups often use threats and coercion to force men and children
to mine for minerals, and these miners are then forced to con-
parliament established a commission to deal with land confiscations, and the
Special Rapporteur recommended making the results public).
68. U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra
note 36, ¶ 109 (Apr. 12, 2001) (“The panel finds a link between the exploita-
tion of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
continuation of the conflict.” In ¶ 148, the panel concluded that the DRC re-
lies on its minerals and mining industries to finance the war).
69. See U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
transmitted by letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146
(Oct.16 2002) (including an annex (Annex III) of eighty-five other companies,
which it declared to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises).
70. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo, Letter dated 12 April
2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,
S/2001/357, ¶ 195 (Apr. 12, 2011) (“Presidents and other decision makers of-
ten tolerate, organize or put in place the framework and conditions to main-
tain the status quo of exploitation and war”); see also Global Witness, Digging
in Corruption, supra note 40.
71. 2014 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at 139 (Democrat-
ic Republic of the Congo).
72. Id.
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tinue working to pay off their constantly accumulating debts
that are impossible to repay.73 The report further recognized
that “a significant number of children in Katanga, Eastern Ka-
sai, Western Kasai, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale are
exploited in artisanal mining.”74 Another report published by
the US Department of Labor in 2012 recognized the prevalence
of the worst forms of child labor in the DRC, in areas including
mining, agriculture, and conscription as child soldiers.75 As
such, there is a possible link between the operation of the de-
velopment projects and the forced labor, forced displacement,
and torture in the country, all of which may constitute corpo-
rate complicity in international crimes.
II. LIMITATIONS IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC SYSTEM
There are four forums through which legal action can be tak-
en to address corporate complicity in international crimes. The
primary responsibility lies with the host government to prevent
all forms of jus cogens crimes occurring in its territory.76 Sec-
ond, the home government may be able to exercise jurisdiction
over corporate officials and the company for extraterritorial ac-
tivities if the corporation is registered in the territory of the
home state. Third, a government may be able to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction against a foreign company and its corporate
officials for alleged international crimes that occurred in for-
eign territory.77 As a last resort, in the event that states are
unwilling or unable to act, the ICC may be able to initiate in-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. U. S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2012),
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/congo_democratic_republic.htm.
76. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obliga-
tio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (1996) (explaining the
concept of jus cogens as “ the compelling law’ [which] holds the highest hier-
archical position among all other norms and principles”).
77. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
81, 88 (2002) (explaining that a state may exercise universal jurisdiction
“without any jurisdictional connection or link between the place of commis-
sion, the perpetrator’s nationality, the victim’s nationality, and the enforcing
state. . . .” Instead, a state may rely “exclusively [o]n the nature of the crime”
for its jurisdictional basis.).
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vestigations into corporate officials. The next section will exam-
ine some of the possibilities and limitations of these four ap-
proaches.
A. Measures by the Host Government
The host government has the responsibility to provide an in-
vestment environment conducive to the protection of rights,
including property rights, basic services such as law enforce-
ment and prudential surveillance, and “efficient and effective”
management of the public sector.78 Yet, in most instances, the
host government is not able to provide an adequate environ-
ment for protecting the rights of individuals and reducing hu-
man rights risks due to lack of effective control. This will be
examined in more detail for the case studies of Burma and the
DRC.
1. Burmese Government
While the Burmese government is not a party to the Rome
Statute, the UN Special Rapporteur has pointed out that “the
mere existence of this possibility [of international crimes]
obliges the Government of Myanmar to take prompt and effec-
tive measures to investigate” the facts concerning alleged per-
petration of international crimes.79 Nevertheless, the Burmese
legal system is limited in its ability to investigate and prevent
such crimes.
Forced labor is criminalized in Burma under the new Wards
and Village Tracts Administration Act, passed in March 2012,
and Penal Code Section 374.80 Forced labor is also prohibited
under Section 359 of the Constitution of Burma, which was en-
78. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Introduction of OECD
Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones
(2006), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/36885821.pdf.
79. H.R.C. Res. 13/48, supra note 12, ¶ 121 22.
80. 2013 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 65, at 112; see THE
REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, THE WARD
OR VILLAGE TRACT ADMINISTRATION LAW,
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs15/2012-
Ward_or_Village_Tract_Administration_Bill-2012-02-24-en.pdf; see also Pe-
nal Code (Myan.), § 374, available at
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/myanmar/Annex%20K%20-
%20Myanmar%20Penal%20Code.pdf.
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acted in 2008.81 As a member of the ILO, moreover, Burma is
obliged to uphold the ILO’s eight conventions, including the
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (ILO No. 105), which
prevents the use of forced labor “as a method of mobilizing and
using labor for purposes of economic development.”82
According to multiple US State Department Human Traffick-
ing Reports, however, the Burmese government is not effective-
ly enforcing these laws. First, the Burmese military and insur-
gents continue to be involved in forced labor. The 2013 report
found that “military personnel and insurgent militia engage in
the unlawful conscription of child soldiers and continue to be
the leading perpetrators of forced labor inside the country, par-
ticularly in conflict-prone ethnic areas.”83 The 2015 report simi-
larly acknowledged that the Burmese military, civilian offi-
cials, and some ethnic armed groups use various forms of coer-
cion to compel victims to provide forced labor.84
Second, the Burmese courts lack transparency and independ-
ence.85 International organizations and non-governmental or-
ganizations are often unable to verify court statistics provided
by the government, and Burma lacks local-level coordination
between police and social welfare officials.86 As a result, the US
State Department has identified the government of Burma as
81. 2013 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 65, at 112; see also
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR (2008), available
at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mm/mm009en.pdf.
82. ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, ¶ 2, 86th Session, Geneva (June 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm ILO
further stated:
[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conven-
tions in question, have an obligation arising from the very
fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to pro-
mote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental
rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely . .
. the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor.
Id.
83. 2013 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 65, at 112 (Burma
has been identified to be on the Tier 2 Watch List); see also 2014 U.S. Human
Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at 114.
84. 2015 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at 105.
85. 2013 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 65, at 112.
86. Id.
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not fully compliant with the minimum standards for prohibit-
ing human trafficking and forced labor.87 The US State De-
partment does recognize that significant efforts have been
made since the recent change in regime, but the climate of im-
punity and oppression created by the previous government con-
tinues to sustain a lack of accountability within military ranks
for the perpetration of forced labor.88
Land confiscations also continue, and villagers are often not
compensated for confiscated land. Corruption persists in the
regulatory procedures governing land compensation, particu-
larly with regard to the MOGE.89 There are reports that MOGE
has retained up to fifty percent of land compensation payments
made by construction companies.90 As such, in a speech made
to the ILO in Geneva on June 14, 2012, pro-democracy leader
Aung San Suu Kyi urged other countries to prohibit their com-
panies from partnering with MOGE unless there existed mech-
anisms for transparency and accountability.91
The Burmese government seems to be aware of these alleged
abuses, but the gas development projects have become a lifeline
for the Burmese authorities. According to the Ministry of Ener-
gy in Burma, the government has already earned more than
$16 billion in total from the gas projects in Burma.92 More spe-
87. Id.; see also 2015 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at
105 (“The Government of Burma does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking”).
88. Id. at 105 06.
89. EarthRights Int’l, There is No Benefit, They Destroyed Our Farmland
(Apr. 2013), http://www.earthrights.org/publication/there-no-benefit-they-
destroyed-our-farmland (reporting based on interviews with Burmese villag-
ers).
90. Marco Simons, Testimony in front of the Tom Lantons Human Rights






91. Stephanie Nebehay & Tom Miles, Suu Kyi Warns Investors Off Myan-
mar’s State Oil & Gas Firm, REUTERS (June 14, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/oukwd-uk-myanmar-suukyi-
idAFBRE85D0KA20120614.
92. Ministry Reveals Gas Revenue for First Time, NATION (July 18, 2012),
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Ministry-reveals-gas-revenue-for-first-
time-30186368.html (“[Burma]’s Energy Ministry, for the first time, unveiled
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cifically, it earned more than $2 billion in 2006 2007, $2.4 bil-
lion in 2007 2008, $2.8 billion in 2008 2009, $2.6 billion in
2009 2010, $2.9 billion in 2010 2011, and $2.6 billion in 2011
2012.93 The ministry claims that the earnings from the projects
were spent on building infrastructure for development within
the country, but certain civil society groups argue that these
earnings are contributing to “high-level corruption and authori-
tarianism”, and ultimately “propping up Burma’s military gov-
ernment.”94
2. The Congolese Government
The situation in the DRC is largely similar to that in Burma.
In July 2006, the government enacted the Sexual Violence
Statute, which prohibits sexual slavery, sex trafficking, child
prostitution, and forced prostitution.95 Adult forced labor is not
criminalized in the DRC and only child labor is prohibited un-
der the Child Protection Code.96 Yet, even here, according to
the US Human Trafficking Report, law and enforcement au-
thorities often do not have sufficient training and resources to
conduct investigations and litigate cases.97 The report further
noted that “impunity for trafficking crimes by the security forc-
to the public its revenue from the Yadanda and Yedagun projects . . . [to]
show transparency in administration.”).
93. Id.
94. Gas Firms ‘Prop up Burma’s Junta,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8249374.stm (reporting that energy giants Total
and Chevron are accused of “propping up Burma’s military government
through their ongoing gas projects in the country”); Earthrights Int’l, Total
Impact: The Human Rights, Environmental and Financial Impacts of Total
and Chevron’s Yadana Gas Project in Military-Ruled Burma (Myanmar) 43
(Sept. 2009), https://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/total-
impact.pdf.
95. 2014 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at 140 (reporting
that “penalties for these offences range from three months to twenty years’
imprisonment”).
96. Id. at 143 (reporting that penalties for forced child labor, debt bondage,
and child commercial sexual exploitation are not “sufficiently stringent” for
the serious nature of the crime); see also 2015 U.S. Human Trafficking Re-
port, supra note 65, at 129 (reporting that “the government did not enact
draft anti-trafficking legislation finalized in the previous reporting year, and
knowledge of the country’s existing anti-trafficking laws was uneven across
the government”).
97. 2014 U.S. Human Trafficking Report, supra note 66, at 143.
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es remained acute.”98 The National Ministry of Labor was re-
sponsible for inspecting worksites for child labor, yet the minis-
try did not identify any cases of forced child labor in 2013.99
The DRC, however, is one of very few countries that have
made efforts in the past to hold corporate officials accountable
for international crimes. In 2007, the Congolese local court
tried three individual company members for complicity in war
crimes related to the Kilwa incident of 2004.100 In that incident,
foreign employees of a multinational company one Canadian
and two South African employees of Anvil Mining were al-
leged to have provided logistical support for a military counter-
offensive.101 The employees were acquitted, however, because
the charges were deemed to be “unfounded”.102 Certain human
rights organizations have claimed that these individuals were
acquitted due to corruption, lack of judicial capacity, and politi-
cal interference in the justice system of the DRC.103 The UN
Mapping Report also concluded that the judicial decisions made
during the Kilwa case illustrated a lack of impartiality and in-
dependence within the military justice system of the DRC.104
98. Id. at 141.
99. Id. at 142.
100. See UN/MONUC Rep. on the Conclusion of the Special Investigation
into Allegations of Summary Executions and Other Violations of Human
Rights Committed by the FARDC in Kilwa (Katanga Province) (Oct. 15 2004),
available at http://raid-
uk.org/docs/Kilwa_Trial/MONUC_report_oct05_eng_translated_by_RAID.pdf;
Adam McBeth, Crush by an Anvil: A Case Study on Responsibility for Human
Rights in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALEHUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 143 47 (2008).
UN Report of the Mapping Exercise, supra note 27, ¶ 778.
101. Global Witness, Victims of Kilwa massacre Denied Justice by Congolese
Military Court (July 17, 2007), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/victims-
kilwa-massacre-denied-justice-congolese-military-court (several human rights
organizations released the report calling for action from governments).
102. Joe Bavier, Congo Court Clears Former Anvil Staff of War Crimes,
REUTERS (June 28, 2007),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/28/idUSL28846669.
103. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses In-
volving Corporations, Democratic Republic of Congo 39 (2012),
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Democratic-Republic-of-
Congo-rights-abuses-corporations-publication-2012.pdf.
104. The report concluded that the Kilwa case demonstrated:
political interference and a lack of impartiality are all the
more striking when economic interests are at stake. The
case could have set an important precedent in terms of cor-
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In addition, considering the economic benefits incurred from
the massive investments surrounding mining operations in Ka-
tanga, the DRC government would need strong incentives to
pursue corporate accountability. The resources-for-
infrastructure deal signed by Chinese state construction com-
panies and Gécamines in April 2008 amounts to $3 billion.105
According to a World Bank report, the DRC’s “superb mineral
resource” can bring in revenues equivalent to about twenty
percent of the GDP by 2020.106
In sum, the direct economic link between corporate projects
and the host governments, as well as the heavy involvement of
Burmese and Congolese authorities in related economic activi-
ties, forced labor, and land confiscations, discourage the gov-
ernment from initiating any investigations. Furthermore, the
lack of transparency and independence characterizing judicial
courts in Burma and the DRC, as well as weak public institu-
tions, hinder the process of promoting effective governance.
B. Measures by the Home Government
In response to such abuses, home governments may be able
to reach out to their corporations to prevent alleged interna-
tional crimes. According to the UN Guiding Principles, under
current international human rights law, home states are not
necessarily obliged to regulate “the extraterritorial activities of
businesses domiciled in their territory [or] jurisdiction,” but are
also not prohibited from doing so.107 These UN Guiding Princi-
porate accountability. Instead, all the defendants were ac-
quitted of the charges relating to the events in Kilwa, in a
trial by a military court that the UN regarded as a failure to
meet international standards of fairness.
U.N. Report of the Mapping Exercise, supra note 27, ¶ 411 43.
105. See Global Witness, China and Congo, supra note 44 (explaining back-
ground and details of the agreement); see also Spears, supra note 44.
106. Manson, supra note 35; World Bank, Project Information Document
Appraisal Stage, DRC-Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector, Report
No. AB5302 (2009), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/04/19
/000262044_20100420091223/Rendered/PDF/PID0appraisal0april016.pdf.
107. U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 5,
at 11; Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, transmitted by note
from Secretary General to the General Assembly, Human Rights and Trans-
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ples do state, however, that with regard to abuses occurring in
conflict-affected areas “where transnational corporations are
involved, their home’ [s]tates thereof have roles to play in as-
sisting both those corporations and host [s]tates to ensure that
businesses are not involved with human rights abuse,” given
that the host state may lack effective control.108 The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises also state that mem-
ber states should encourage enterprises operating within their
territories to observe the Guidelines “wherever they operate,”
taking into account the particular circumstances of each coun-
try.109 Some scholars and practitioners have even adopted new
principles, such as the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritori-
al Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which recognize that the “extraterritorial obli-
gations” of states exist to “respect, protect and fulfill economic,
social and cultural rights.”110
In line with such trends, countries such as the US and UK
have begun to implement Responsible Investment Reporting
Requirements for companies that may face risks of extraterri-
torial human rights abuse. With respect to the investments in
Burma, the US government requires all US companies invest-
ing in Burma to release detailed public reports showing their
efforts taken to respect human and labor rights and prevent
national Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 14, UN Doc.
A/68/279 (Aug. 7, 2013).
108. Commentary to Principle 7, U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, supra note 5 (recognizing that the host state may not be able
to protect human rights adequately due to a lack of effective control).
109. See OECD, The OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises, Text
and Commentary, at 17 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.
110. Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the
area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted at a gathering con-
vened by Maastricht University and the International Commission of Jurists
on September 28, 2011 (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications/2012.02.29_-
_Maastricht_Principles_on_Extraterritorial_Obligations.pdf; Olivier de
Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a tool for improving the Human
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corruption.111 The US further requires companies to disclose
their use of conflict minerals in the products they manufac-
tured under the Dodd-Frank Act.112 On December 16, 2016, the
US State Department released the US National Action Plan on
Responsible Business Conduct, following other countries, such
as the UK.113 In addition, the UK government made recent
changes to the Companies Act in October 2013 by requiring
certain commercial organizations to report non-financial infor-
mation, including disclosures on human rights, and further en-
111. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BURMA RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (2013) [hereinafter US Burma Reporting Requirements] (re-
quiring any US person, individual, or entity, to notify the Department of
State of due diligence policies and procedures in which the individual or enti-
ty is taking revenue for a new investment in Burma); Steven Lee Myers, U.S.
Companies Investing in Myanmar Must Show Steps to Respect Human
Rights, N. Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/asia/us-companies-investing-in-
myanmar-must-show-steps-to-respect-human-rights.html.
112. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502.
113. See U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT, FIRST
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Dec. 16, 2016),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265918.pdf (explaining that the
National Action Plan focuses on a broad range of issues including “human
rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, labor rights, land tenure and proper-
ty rights, anti-corruption, and transparency.”); see also White House, An-
nouncement of Opportunity to Provide Input into the U.S. National Action
Plan on Responsible Business Conduct (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/20/announcement-opportunity-
provide-input-us-national-action-plan-responsible-business- (“On September
24, 2014, the President announced plans to develop a National Action Plan to
promote responsible business conduct abroad, consistent with the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises”).
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acted the UK Modern Slavery Act in 2015.114 Today, more than
twenty countries have followed similar measures.115
For serious human rights abuses amounting to international
crimes, states also have the option to prosecute corporate offi-
cials for involvement in the crime. For example, Dutch courts
prosecuted Dutch corporate officials in 2005 for selling chemi-
cals to the Iraqi government for the production of mustard gas,
which was used in the massacres against Kurdish minorities in
Iraq.116 Such practices may be a step forward, but criminal law
scholars have found that individual criminal responsibility has
less of an impact in incentivizing companies to adopt effective
compliance measures within their organizational structures
than placing direct liability on the organization itself.117 On the
114. See SEC’Y OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS BY
COMMAND OF HM, Good Business: Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights, 2013, Cm. 8695, at 13 (UK) (setting out obligations to protect
against human rights abuse within UK jurisdiction involving business enter-
prises); see also Modern Slavery Act, 2015, C. 30 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted/data.ht; HOME
OFFICE, GUIDANCE, PUBLISH AN ANNUAL MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/publish-an-annual-modern-slavery-
statement (requiring all commercial organizations that operate in the UK
with an annual turnover of 36 million pounds or more to prepare a Slavery
and Human Trafficking Statement each financial year).
115. The UN Working Group strongly encouraged all states to develop, en-
act and update a National Action Plan as part of their state responsibility.
See OHCHR, State National Action Plans,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
116. Kaleck, supra note 4; Rb. Gravenhage [District Court of The
Hague], Dec. 23, 2005, AU8685 2005, m.nt. (Public Prosecutor
/ Van Anraat) (Neth.), Hof-Gravenhage [Court of Appeals, The Hague], Jul. 8,
2007, NJFS 2007, 183 m.nt. (Public Prosecutor / Van Anraat) (Neth.),
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx? Snelzoeken=true&searchtype
=ljn&ljn=BA6734&u_ljn=BA6734.
117. See generally CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2001) (explaining the debates surrounding the consid-
eration of corporate criminal liability in courts, legislatures, and internation-
al organizations); BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME
AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (explaining why accountability for corporate
crime is necessary, and examining theories and strategies to hold corpora-
tions accountable); John C. Coffee, Jr. “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”:
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79
MICH. L. REV. 386, 387 (1981) (examining the different perspectives for corpo-
rate punishment and arguing that “law enforcement officials cannot afford to
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other hand, home governments may be able to exercise juris-
diction over the parent company for the conduct of its subsidi-
aries under existing national laws. One recent case, in which
Swiss authorities opened an investigation against a Swiss re-
finer for pillaging gold from the DRC, is a major example.118
The challenge lies in the fact that business communities in
general have shown strong opposition to greater regulation of
private investment activities abroad because of the negative
impact such regulations may have on their competitiveness. US
companies, in particular, have expressed opposition to the re-
porting requirements issued by the US government for invest-
ments in Burma, as well as under the Dodd-Frank Act for con-
flict minerals.119 As a result, state authorities are reluctant to
punish the extraterritorial activities of companies and company
officials, particularly when large economic costs and benefits
are at stake. The estimated investment by the Chinese compa-
ny CNPC for its gas pipeline project in Burma totals around
$2.54 billion, and the pipeline is expected to significantly re-
duce China’s energy import costs.120
Nonetheless, there have been certain avenues for victims to
seek legal redress through civil action in the US, such as the
Unocal case under the unique mechanism of the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATS).121 The recent decision of the Supreme Court
ignore either the individual or the firm in choosing their targets, but can real-
ize important economies of scale by simultaneously pursuing both”).
118. James G. Stewart, Opinion, Punish Companies That Pillage, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/opinion/punish-
companies-that-pillage.html.
119. With regard to the Dodd-Frank Act, some argue that the law is “ad-
versely affecting innocent bystanders,” since it is resulting in a “de facto em-
bargo of minerals,” see Ben Goad, Wall Street Reform Rule Said to Increase
Violence in Congo, HILL (May 21, 2013),
http://thehill.com/regulation/business/301075-wall-street-reform-rule-said-to-
have-increased-congolese-violence (Republican Bill Huizenga stated that it
“has only led to more violence in the region”); there has also been resistance
from U.S. Chamber of Commerce on US Burma Reporting Requirements. See
Lee Myers, supra note 111. (John Goyer, the chamber’s senior director for the
region, argued that American investment in Burma “should be encouraged,
not hindered”).
120. Myanmar-China Pipelines, HYDROCARBONS TECHNOLOGY,
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/-myanmar-china-pipelines/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
121. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (brought
against Unocal in the US under the ATS in September 1996, alleging that the
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of the United States in the Kiobel case, however, is likely to re-
duce this impact.122 First, it will be more difficult to hold for-
eign companies liable using the sufficient territorial nexus re-
quirement.123 Second, there continues to be a debate over cor-
porate liability under the ATS following the decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit in Kiobel, which reversed previous judgments by
ruling that the ATS does not reach corporate entities.124 There
are also certain limits to civil litigation when it comes to deter-
ring corporate abuses in most countries.125 The US is unique in
allowing civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over parent compa-
nies for extraterritorial acts. Most countries in Europe and
Asia do not provide such wide extraterritorial scope.126
C. Universal Jurisdiction by a Third Government
In addition to the host and home governments, a third coun-
try may claim universal jurisdiction over a foreign company for
alleged international crimes perpetrated in a foreign territory.
In fact, such an attempt was made on April 25, 2002 when
Burmese refugees filed suit in Belgium against Total, its
chairman, and the former president of its affiliate in Burma.127
The refugees alleged that the company’s “complicity in crimes
against humanity” under Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Act
company was complicit in the abuse of villagers by the Burmese government.
This was a revolutionary case because the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized corporate liability for forced labor based on the complicity
standard that Unocal “knowingly” assisted the military in perpetrating the
abuses).
122. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 109 (2013).
123. Id.
124. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 565 U.S. 961 (2011) (mem.); but see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d
736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.); Flomo
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
125. See James Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Liability for International
Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121
(2014).
126. See Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the
United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 846, 849 (2013) (explaining that the ab-
sence of civil suits for human rights violations by corporations in European
civil law countries is “largely because such civil actions are unusual and be-
cause the benefits of the legal cost structure available in the United States do
not exist in European civil law states”).
127. See EUROPEAN LAWYER REFERENCE SERIES, GLOBAL BUSINESS & HUMAN
RIGHTS: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS 107-109 (2011).
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of June 16, 1993 constituted serious violations of international
human rights.128 The lawsuit against Total in Belgium was the
first-ever attempt to hold a company criminally liable for inter-
national crimes in a national court based on universal jurisdic-
tion.129 The Belgian Cour de Cassation, however, subsequently
dismissed the case in 2005, after the Belgian law providing for
universal jurisdiction was repealed.130
As such, with the retreat of universal jurisdiction, states are
generally not incentivized to exercise universal jurisdiction
over foreign corporations or individuals.131 Other countries may
exercise universal civil jurisdiction, with the US ATS serving
as a unique example. The recent Kiobel decision, however,
demonstrates that states are largely reluctant to recognize
“foreign cubed” cases in which there is a foreign plaintiff suing
a foreign defendant for acts committed on foreign soil.132
D. Enforcement through the International Criminal Court
In instances where a state is unable or unwilling to take ac-
tion as provided under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC
may be able to act as a last resort for investigating alleged in-
ternational crimes that were authorized or directed by a corpo-
rate official.133 In the case study of Burma, Korea and France
are parties to the Rome Statute and, therefore, the ICC may be
able to exercise jurisdiction over corporate officials who are na-
tionals of those two countries for directing and authorizing the
128. Id.
129. See also Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Total Lawsuit in Belgium (re
Myanmar), http://business-humanrights.org/en/total-lawsuit-in-belgium-re-
myanmar#c9336 (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
130. Id. (“In October 2007, based on the universal jurisdiction law as modi-
fied by the Constitutional Court, the Belgian federal prosecutor’s office
opened a new investigation into this case. The Belgian authorities declared
the case closed’ in March 2008, dropping the case against Total”).
131. See also Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction, 105
AM. J. INT’L. L. 1 (2011) (arguing that there is a tendency for “universal juris-
diction [to concentrate] on defendants who impose little or no cost on prose-
cuting states”).
132. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. at 108.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 17; see Reinhold Gallmetzer, Prose-
cuting Persons Doing Business with Armed Groups in Conflict Areas, 8 J.
INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 947 (2010) (explaining how the Office of the Prosecutor of
the ICC investigates and prosecutes those who finance or assist armed
groups in conflict areas).
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alleged crimes in Burma. The UN and other international or-
ganizations, such as the ILO, have also considered the possibil-
ity of taking the situation in Burma to the ICC through the UN
Security Council.134
The ICC, however, has certain limitations. First, the ICC on-
ly exercises jurisdiction over cases that are the “most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”
under Article 5 of the Rome Statute.135 Article 17 further states
that the case must have “sufficient gravity” for the ICC to “jus-
tify further action by the Court.”136 Moreover, the ICC has not
investigated leaders of the Burmese military regime, and under
such circumstances, it is unlikely that the ICC will investigate
corporate officials who are allegedly facilitating or encouraging
crimes committed by the regime.137 Second, even if the ICC
does pursue individual criminal responsibility of a corporate
official, the Rome Statute does not cover all crimes concerning
commercial activity. For example, trafficking in conflict goods,
a common crime in conflict regions, is not covered under the
Rome Statute.138 Furthermore, in order to effectively deter
abuses and change the behavior of corporations, corporate lia-
bility needs to be recognized.139 However, these strategies,
though already adopted in many national legal systems, have
not been established under the ICC regime since the ICC was
designed to focus on individuals. As such, more sophisticated
strategies are necessary to effectively regulate corporations.
134. Int’l Labor Office, Governing Body, Developments Concerning the Ques-
tion of the Observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labor
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Legal Aspects Arising out of the 95th Session of the
International Labor Conference, GB.297/8/2 (Nov. 2006),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/refs/pdf/pv297.pdf (find-
ing that widespread use of forced labor would be “relevant points of depar-
ture” for any investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC); See also H.R.C. Res.
13/48, supra note 12, ¶ 121 22 (“United Nations institutions may consider
the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding
mandate to address the question of international crimes”).
135. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 5.
136. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 17(1)(d).
137. See Gallmetzer, supra note 133, at 951 (“The fact that the ICC can only
prosecute a limited number of crimes will necessarily leave an impunity gap.
This gap will often include persons providing armed groups with finances,
weapons and ammunition.”).
138. See id.
139. Stewart, supra note 125.
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III. REDUCING THEGOVERNANCEGAP
The case studies of Burma and the DRC illustrate that there
are limitations on inducing states to take action against corpo-
rations for complicity in international crimes. In this regard,
there is clearly a need for new international norms and mecha-
nisms to guide and help states take more action against corpo-
rate complicity in gross human rights abuses that may amount
to international crimes. In this context, the next part of this
article will examine developing norms in the area of business
and human rights and assess whether these norms can be ef-
fective in reducing the governance gap in the system.
A. Current Norms and Discussions for Future Norms on Busi-
ness and Human Rights
In the area of business and human rights, there are two types
of norms. The most authoritative text to date is the UN Guid-
ing Principles, which was adopted unanimously by the UN
Human Rights Council.140 The Guiding Principles are based on
existing duties of states under international human rights
treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the two UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).141 Although these human rights treaties do not di-
rectly address states’ duties regarding business, they do impose
obligations on states to protect human rights, including abuses
arising from non-state parties within their jurisdictional
boundaries.142 This includes the duty of states to protect their
own citizens against harmful business activities. Therefore, if
states fail to take appropriate steps to “prevent, investigate,
punish, and redress private actors’ abuse,” they may be in
breach of their international human rights law obligations.143
140. See U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra
note 5, at 3.
141. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 40 42; G.A. Res. 217A (III),
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2
(1978).
142. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 40 42.
143. See U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Commen-
tary, supra note 5, at 3.
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On the other hand, since July 2015, there have been discus-
sions of a new treaty on business and human rights, based on
the resolution proposed by representatives from Ecuador and
South Africa at the twenty-sixth session of the UN Human
Rights Council.144 It is still unclear when, or even whether,
such a treaty will be adopted; many debates have ensued
among scholars, practitioners, and human rights activists over
whether a treaty is necessary and what it might look like.145
Various reasons for adopting the treaty have been suggested.
Some human rights groups argue that not much has improved
on the ground since the adoption of the UN Guiding Princi-
144. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legal-
ly binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business en-
terprises with respect to human rights, ¶ 1, Res. A/HRC/RES/26 /9 (July 14,
2014) (directing the UN “to establish an open-ended intergovernmental work-
ing group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
respect to human rights; whose mandate shall be to elaborate an internation-
al legally binding instrument to regulate in international human rights law,
the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”);
The first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to
human rights was held from July 6 10, 2015, at the Palais des Nations, Ge-
neva, see United Human Rights Council, Open-ended Intergovernmental
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Respect to Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC
.aspx (last visited Oct.. 19, 2019); Some six hundred non-governmental organ-
izations that have signed on in support through a treaty alliance, see Treaty
Alliance, Global Movement for a Binding Treaty,
http://www.treatymovement.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
145. See John Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN
Business and Human Rights Treaty, Commentary, INST. FOR HUM. RTS. AND
BUS. (July 8, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/commentary/past-as-
prologue.html#_edn4 (explaining the difficulties of adopting a treaty, particu-
larly due to opposition from home countries of most transnational corpora-
tions); see also David Bilchitz, The Necessity for a Business and Human
Rights Treaty, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 203 (2016), (explaining the need for a
treaty on business and human rights to cure the “lacunae and ambiguities” in
international law in this field); Shane Darcy, Key Issues in the Debate on a
Binding Business and Human Rights Instrument, BUS. & HUM. RTS. IN
IRELAND (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://businesshumanrightsireland.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/key-issues-in-
the-debate-on-a-binding-business-and-human-rights-instrument/ (discussing
issues surrounding the treaty on business and human rights).
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ples.146 A number of organizations further argue that a treaty
would be necessary for international standard-setting, particu-
larly when it comes to the “definition or application of stand-
ards relating to the extraterritorial dimension of the [s]tate du-
ty to protect” and “standards on gross human rights violations
[that are] applicable to business enterprises.”147 Proponents
also argue that there is a need for a more “formal and robust”
system of international monitoring and supervision, and new
ways to enhance international cooperation surrounding effec-
tive investigation and adjudication.148 As a result, hundreds of
human rights organizations have initiated a global call to sup-
port an inter-governmental process seeking a legally binding
instrument on the issue of business and human rights.149
John Ruggie, the Special Rapporteur who is the author of the
UN Guiding Principles, initially did not suggest adopting a new
treaty, believing it would be difficult to garner support from the
home countries of most multinational corporations.150 There
had been similar attempts in the past, for example when the
UN Commission on Human Rights proposed a treaty-like text
entitled “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Hu-
man Rights” in 2003,151 which failed due to resistance from
states and businesses.152 Also, given the many complexities
146. See e.g., Audrey Gaughran, Closing Remarks at 2014 UN Forum on




147. Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Needs and Options for a New International




149. See e.g. Treaty Alliance, supra note 144
150. See John Ruggie, supra note 145.
151. U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 (Aug. 26, 2003).
152. See also Jens Martens, Corporate Influence on the Business and Hu-
man Rights Agenda of the United Nations, (Jun. 2014) (unpublished manu-
script),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Corporate_Influence_on
_the_Business_and_Human_Rights_Agenda.pdf. See also Corporate Influence
on the Business and Human Rights Agenda of the United Nations, 5 (working
paper, Jun. 2014), available at
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Corporate_Influence_on
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surrounding national and international law, a single treaty
might not be capable of addressing the full range of human
rights issues.153
There are signs, however, that attitudes towards business
and human rights have changed in the last two decades. Re-
cent polls by the UN Global Compact and the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit show that a large majority of corporate executives
recognize that human rights matter for businesses.154 They also
perceive that more global regulation can be effective in creating
a level playing field.155
Ruggie has also not completely dismissed the possibility of
adopting a treaty, emphasizing that it should be based on suffi-
cient consensus and precise standards.156 He even suggests
that it may be possible adopt a treaty focusing on the “worst of
the worst,” as in gross human rights abuses that may amount
to international crimes.157 Such an approach would be more
feasible because broad consensus already exists among states
on the underlying prohibitions and greater extraterritorial ap-
_the_Business_and_Human_Rights_Agenda.pdf (“All these efforts met with
vigorous opposition from TNCs and their business associations, and they ul-
timately failed.”).
153. Id.
154. See generally The UN Global Compact- Accenture CEO Study on Sus-
tainability 2013, Architects of a Better World (Sept. 2013),
https://acnprod.accenture.com/~/media/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Strategy_5/Accenture-UN-Global-
Compact-Acn-CEO-Study-Sustainability-2013.pdf (More than one thousand
top executives from twenty-seven industries in 103 countries participated in
the study); The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Road From Principles To





156. John G. Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An Issues
Brief by John G. Ruggie, Harvard Kennedy School, John F. Kennedy School of
Government (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf; see also John Ruggie,
Life In the Global Public Domain: Response To Commentaries on the UN
Guiding Principles and the Proposed Treaty on Business and Human Rights,
5 (Jan. 23, 2015) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2554726
(emphasizing that in order for the treaty to be successful, it should contain
“carefully constructed precision tools”).
157. Id.
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plication for these abuses.158 With this in mind, as a follow-up
to his mandate, Ruggie called for a multilateral process to ad-
dress gross human rights violations or abuses in relation to the
conduct of business enterprises in 2011.159 He stated that
“greater consistency in legal protection is highly desirable, and
that it could be best advanced through a multilateral ap-
proach.”160 Moreover, Ruggie pointed out that there needs to be
more certainty in terms of standards concerning the investiga-
tion, punishment, and redress of businesses, as well as the ap-
propriate basis and extent for exercising jurisdiction abroad.161
Ruggie further suggested that the UN Convention against Cor-
ruption could serve as a model since it also concerns ethical
business practices and require similar regulations on a domes-
tic level.162
If such a treaty is adopted, it could be an effective way for
states to enact necessary legislation and domesticate interna-
tional obligations, provided they ratify it.163 For example, the
treaty may “specify certain internationally recognized crimes,”
requiring states to establish corporate liability for these
crimes.164 Similar provisions have been found in other interna-
tional conventions, imposing a duty on the state to establish
“liability of legal persons” by placing an indirect legal obliga-
158. Id.; see also Jenny S. Martinez, A First Step is Better than No Step at
All, http://jamesgstewart.com/a-first-step-is-better-than-no-step-at-all/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2019).
159. John G. Ruggie, Recommendations on Follow Up To the Mandate,
United Nations, Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-




161. Id. (Ruggie suggested that as an option, an “intergovernmental process
of drafting a new international legal instrument to address the specific chal-
lenges posed by this protection gap” could be considered).
162. Id.; See also JOHNRUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, supra note 5, at 200.
163. Darcy, supra note 145.
164. See DOUGLASS CASSEL&ANITA RAMASASTRY, WHITE PAPER: OPTIONS FOR
A TREATY ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2015), http://business- human-
rights.org/sites/default/files/documents/whitepaperfinal%20ABA%20LS%206
%2022 %2015.pf.
(discussing possible substance and formation of the treaty).
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tion on the corporation.165 The OECD Convention on Bribery of
Foreign Officials requires that states establish corporate crimi-
nal liability; in the event that a certain state does not recognize
such liability, non-criminal sanctions may then be pursued
against the corporate entity.166 A treaty could also specify a
standard of due diligence as a measure of defense or mitigation
for companies.167
Nevertheless, many difficulties remain in reaching a consen-
sus among all stakeholders. The first session of the UN Inter-
governmental Working Group was convened from July 6 10,
2015 to draft a treaty on business and human rights, with the
participation of civil society groups and business organiza-
tions.168 This forum garnered much attention but, reportedly,
many key home states of transnational corporations did not
fully participate in the discussions.169 For example, the US has
165. See OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, art. 3(1), Dec. 17, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 1. [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention]; United Nations Con-
vention Against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter U.N.
Convention against Corruption]; United Nations Convention on Transnation-
al Organized Crime, art.10, Dec. 15 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209, the Optional
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
(2002), and the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financ-
ing of Terrorism, art. 5, Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197. (All these conven-
tions include a provision on “liability of legal persons” requiring states to
place “effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties” on both
natural and legal persons); Since not all states recognize the concept of corpo-
rate criminal responsibility, it could also include a provision on non-criminal
sanctions, such as civil remedies and administrative sanctions, as in many
other treaties regulating the liability of legal persons.
166. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 165, art. 3(2).
167. CASSEL&RAMASASTRY, supra note 164, at ES-2.
168. U.N. Human Rights Council, First Session of the Open-Ended Intergov-
ernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/50 (Feb. 5,
2016); see also Maria Fernanda (Chairperson-Rapporteur Amb.), Report of the
Open- ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (Draft)
(Jul. 10, 2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Sessio
n1/Draftreport .pdf; Carlos Lopez & Ben Shea, Negotiating a Treaty on Busi-
ness and Human Rights: A Review of the First Intergovernmental Session, 1
BUS. ANDHUM. RTS. J. 111, 111 16 (2015).
169. Doug Cassel, Treaty Process Gets Underway: Whoever Said It would be
Easy? BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CENTRE BLOG (July 12, 2015),
http://business-humanrights.org/en/treaty-process-gets-underway-whoever-
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already begun to boycott the intergovernmental process.170 It
argues that the UN Guiding Principles were a success and that
a new treaty could undermine this effort. The US also argues
that a one-size-fits-all instrument is not the appropriate meth-
od for regulating the complexities of business.171 Another prob-
lem is that states are not able to agree on the scope and sub-
stance of the treaty, particularly with regard to the scope and
size of companies that would be regulated.172
Despite all of the challenges, there is still strong momentum
to establish a new treaty on business and human rights due to
a desire for a more binding instrument.173 Therefore, in July
2018, the open-ended intergovernmental working group on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
respect to human rights released their first draft of the legally
binding instrument, which is also referred to as the “Zero
Draft.” 174 The Zero Draft aims to strengthen existing norms
and ensure “effective access to justice and remedies” for vic-
tims, as well as to advance international cooperation to fulfill
said-it-would-be-easy (explaining that Australia, Canada and the US did not
attend the forum, and the European Union walked out on the second day.
The EU proposed to only include businesses with a “transnational character
in their operational activities,” but this proposal was not accepted by many
states).
170. The US has boycotted the entire intergovernmental process for a treaty
on business and human rights. See Statement by Stephen Townley, delega-
tion of the United States of America, Permanent Mission of the United States
of America to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in
Geneva, Proposed Working Group Would Undermine Efforts to Implement





172. Id. (South Africa opposed the EU proposal to exclude “local businesses
registered in terms of relevant domestic law,” because it questions the merits
of a treaty that would extend to companies beyond transnational corpora-
tions).
173. See Bilchitz, supra note 145, (arguing that a treaty is necessary to pro-
vide legal solutions to remedy serious lacunae and ambiguities in the current
framework of international law).
174. Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In International Human
Rights Law, The Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, (Jul. 16, 2018), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/DraftLBI.pdf.
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states’ obligations under international human rights law.175 It
consists of a total of fifteen articles, which lay out the scope,
definitions, jurisdiction, statute of limitations, applicable law,
rights of victims, prevention, legal liability, mutual legal assis-
tance, international cooperation, consistency with international
law, institutional arrangements, as well as a section on final
provisions that explains the technical aspects of the instru-
ment.176 One of the most significant parts of the instrument is
the institutional arrangement requiring states parties to estab-
lish a Committee that has the authority to make general com-
ments or other concluding observations and recommendations
on the implementation on the Convention itself.177
Subsequent to this instrument, an optional protocol was also
adopted that provided more binding force. It did so by requiring
states parties under Article 1 to establish, within their own le-
gal and administrative systems, a National Implementation
Mechanism to promote and monitor compliance.178
B. Elements Necessary to Reduce the Governance Gap
Based on the case studies of Burma and the DRC, as well as
recent discussions in the area of business and human rights, it
can be concluded that three elements need to be further devel-
oped in the area of business and human rights to effectively




178. Human Rights Council, Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally Binding
Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights Law, The Activities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Sessi
on4/ZeroDraftOPLegally.pdf.
179. See also Olivier De Schutter, Towards a New Treaty on Business and
Human Rights, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 41 (2015). De Schutter argues that four
options need to be considered in the open-ended intergovernmental working
group:
1) to clarify and strengthen the states’ duty to protect hu-
man rights, including extraterritorially; 2) to oblige states,
through a framework convention, to report on the adoption
and implementation of national action plans on business
and human rights; 3) to impose direct human rights obliga-
tions on corporations and establish a new mechanism to
monitor compliance with such obligations; and 4) to impose
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enforcement mechanisms fail to induce states to take more ac-
tion against their own and foreign companies. As illustrated in
the case studies, states are reluctant to take action against
corporations, largely due to the economic benefits they receive
from these companies, as well as the close ties between gov-
ernments and large conglomerates. For these reasons, many
civil society groups and scholars argue for the need to establish
an enforcement or monitoring mechanism, to oversee the im-
plementation of existing norms on business and human rights
and generate more awareness and capacity on these issues.180
It is vital to note that monitoring mechanisms, such as the one
described in the Zero Treaty, can be an effective means to in-
duce compliance, not by merely enforcing norms on states, but
by generating more awareness on the norms and enhancing
capacity of states. In fact, empirical studies on monitoring
mechanisms have shown that they can be effective in inducing
greater compliance among states, even if they do not induce
full compliance. It is certainly worth considering this option as
a way to promote more awareness among states on their obli-
gations to ensure corporations are not complicit in serious hu-
man rights abuses within their jurisdictional boundaries, as
well as to enhance their capacity through continuous sharing of
information and knowledge on best practices.181
duties of mutual legal assistance on states to ensure access
to effective remedies for victims harmed by transnational
operations of corporations.
180. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference? 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002) (explaining the importance of monitor-
ing in human rights treaties); see also generally PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE OFHUMAN RIGHTS TREATYMONITORING (2000).
181. See generally Seunghyun Nam, Domestic Impact of the Management
Process under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, U. PENN. J. INT’ L. 955
(2018); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, NEW
SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1995) (drawing from the Chayeses’ writing about interna-
tional regimes and treaty compliance in the arms control and environmental
fields, based on their vast practical experiences); see also Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior
Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311 (1991); Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A
New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance, 4 INT’L. SEC. 147
(1990); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Living Under a Treaty
Regime: Compliance, Interpretation, and Adaptation, in DEFENDING
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Another measure for enhancing compliance is to require
states to place liability on legal persons or companies for gross
serious human rights abuses that may amount to international
crimes. As mentioned, the ICC has discussed the possibility of
expanding the jurisdiction of the court to include not only lia-
bility of natural persons, but also legal persons.182 Nonetheless,
states parties will most likely oppose including liability of legal
DETERRENCEMANAGING THE ABM TREATY REGIME INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 197
(Antonia Handler Chayes & Paul Doty eds., 1989).
182. Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, the draft statute for the ICC
submitted to the delegates did, at one point, include jurisdiction over legal
persons, see Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, art. 23(5) & art. 76, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, (Apr. 14, 1998) The draft considered:
The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons,
with the exception of states, when the crimes committed
were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their
agencies or representatives, and Article 76 regulates Penal-
ties applicable to legal persons’ and states that a legal per-
son shall incur one or more of the following penalties: (i)
fines, (ii) dissolution, (iii) prohibition, (iv) closure, (v) forfei-
ture, (vi) appropriate forms of reparation.
Id.
See also Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction under International
Criminal law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi eds.,
2000); for reasons not reaching an agreement, see Per Saland, International
Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). Saland explained:
whether to include criminal responsibility of legal entities . .
. . This matter deeply divided the delegations. For repre-
sentatives of countries whose legal system does not provide
for the criminal responsibility of legal entities, it was hard
to accept its inclusion, which would have had far-reaching
legal consequences for the question of complementarity.
Others strongly favored the inclusion on grounds of efficien-
cy. . . . Among the last opponents were Nordic countries,
Switzerland, the Russian Federation and Japan. Some other
countries opposed inclusion on procedural . . . grounds. Time
was running out. . . . Eventually, it was recognized that the
issue could not be settled by consensus in Rome. . . .
Id.
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persons. Thus, a more realistic approach is to oblige states to
impose liability on companies for complicity in serious human
rights abuses, as in the anti-corruption regime, including the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UN Convention
against Corruption.183 Article 10 of the Zero Treaty also follows
this model in the anti-corruption regime by requiring states to
ensure that their domestic laws hold both natural and legal
persons liable in a criminal, civil, or administrative manner for
violations of human rights in the context of transnational busi-
ness activity. This is in alignment with recent developments in
the draft treaty on crimes against humanity, whereby the In-
ternational Law Commission included a provision on liability of
legal persons for crimes against humanity. That was the first
time that an instrument on international criminal law recog-
nized the liability of legal persons.184
Second, existing norms, including the UN Guiding Principles,
still lack clarity, particularly with regard to the issue of extra-
territoriality. As the case studies illustrate, companies are of-
ten accused of involvement in serious human rights abuses for
acts outside of the territory where they are based or registered.
Yet, it is still unclear what role the host state and the home
state need to play in preventing and addressing potential abus-
es. Since these abuses often take place due to lack of govern-
ance in weak and failed states, the home state clearly must
play a fundamental role. That being said, the UN Guiding
Principles do not explicitly mention whether a home state has,
as a matter of law, a duty to exercise its jurisdiction extraterri-
torially. Due to such ambiguity, there is strong reluctance
among home states to investigate or exercise any form of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. The Zero Treaty, however, aims to re-
183. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 165; U.N. Convention
Against Corruption, supra note 165.
184. G.A. Res. A/CN.4/L.892, art. 6(7) (May 26, 2017), Crimes against hu-
manity, Texts and titles of the draft preamble, the draft articles and the draft
annex provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on first reading (May
26, 2017) Art. 6(7)
Subject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall
take measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability
of legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft arti-
cle. Subject to the legal principles of the State, such liability
of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.
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duce this gap by stipulating a broad scope of jurisdiction in
terms of states’ obligations. In other words, a new instrument
needs to emphasize that a state can be responsible for acts that
take place outside of its own territory if there is a sufficient
link between the company and the jurisdiction of the state.185
Third, there is a need for more international cooperation,
such as through mutual legal assistance when carrying out in-
ternational investigations. Yet, the case studies show that
states rarely cooperate with one another to carry out investiga-
tions regarding business and human rights issues, largely due
to a lack of awareness and capacity. For this reason, more in-
ternational mechanisms need to be in place to enhance legal
coordination between the host and home states through bilat-
eral treaties on mutual legal assistance or other relevant multi-
lateral treaties.186 Only through such effective mutual legal co-
operation can justice for the victims be achieved, primarily for
such transnational cases involving multiple jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
There is clearly a push from developing countries and civil
society groups for more norms and regulations in the area of
business and human rights, but more developed states and
companies tend to resist such movements due to concerns that
it will hinder their economic activities. Nonetheless, it can be
observed from the case studies in Burma and the DRC that a
governance gap does exist, and if this gap is not reduced, indi-
viduals will continue to suffer from potential human rights
risks.
To reduce this gap, some argue for the need to adopt a treaty
on business and human rights for a more binding instrument.
Others find that it is not necessary to add another layer to the
already existing UN Guiding Principles. A new treaty could
certainly be a way to enforce better compliance, but the objec-
tive should not be to make a more binding instrument. Instead,
the attention should be on finding effective and creative ways
to raise more awareness, increase capacity of states, and make
a business case for human rights, which can be implemented in
185. See HRC Res. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (Sept. 29, 2017).
186. See also Nam, supra note 181, at 1004 (explaining the importance of
legal coordination among states for effective enforcement of international
norms regulating businesses).
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the form of a treaty or with other instruments. Such mecha-
nisms would be more effective in inducing compliance among
states and promoting sustainable business practices and sup-
port from the business community.
